The European Business Council for Africa

We, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), met in Elmau, Germany, on 26-28 June 2022, were joined by the Leaders of Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal and South Africa, as well as Ukraine.

At a time when the world is threatened by division and shocks, we, the G7, stand united. We underscore our resolve to, together with partners, jointly defend universal human rights and democratic values, the rules-based multilateral order, and the resilience of our democratic societies. In doing so, we will address the key challenges of our time:

This technical note was written by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) as part of the project “AgrInvest-Food Systems: Enabling inclusive and efficient private sector investment in agri-food systems”, implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in partnership with the ECDPM. The AgrInvest-Food Systems Project (AgrInvest-FS) aims at attracting private investment into agrifood systems aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by leveraging public funds.

The note applies a systematic approach to the five agrivalue chains over the four countries covered in the AgrInvest-FS project, to identify relevant financing instruments and relevant types of financing institutions, which could potentially be interested in financing a segment of the value chain.

Communities in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing the most severe droughts in decades, impacting livestock and crop production. In 2019, the EU presented plans to increase adaptation finance in Africa under the EU Green Deal. This paper questions whether the Green Deal and Global Europe, the EU’s instrument for neighbourhood, development and international cooperation, have led to increased political support for climate change adaptation for agriculture to the benefit of smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa. Or is the EU repackaging what already existed?

Answering this complex question means looking at potential shifts in four areas related to EU development, cooperation and finance: (1) narrative as expressed in recent policies and strategies towards Africa and the new programming documents; (2) financing modalities and instruments; (3) partnerships with EU members states, the private sector and development finance institutes; and, (4) implementation of projects in the period 2021-2022.

Ce document analyse et met en lumière les intérêts et les jeux et enjeux autour de deux organisations régionales qui se chevauchent en Afrique de l’Ouest : La CEDEAO (Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest), qui compte quinze membres, et l’UEMOA (Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine), dont les huit membres sont également membres de la CEDEAO. Nous explorons l’interaction des mandats formels et des structures de coopération des deux organisations, en examinant leur histoire, leur légitimité et les intérêts des États membres. Nous nous concentrant particulièrement sur le commerce régional.

La position du Nigéria en matière d’intégration régionale peut sembler incohérente, bien qu’il ait ratifié la Zone de libre-échange continentale africaine et qu’il se soit engagé à réaliser une union douanière par le biais de la CEDEAO. Par exemple, en 2019, il a unilatéralement fermé ses frontières terrestres avec les pays voisins, provoquant des perturbations majeures dans les réseaux commerciaux régionaux. Cela a, à son tour, eu un impact négatif sur les efforts de facilitation du commerce promus par les partenaires de développement pour assurer la circulation fluide des marchandises à travers les frontières.

The growth of Russia’s presence across Africa over the last decade has generated significant international concern, further exacerbated after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s engagement can affect the interests and policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states (MS) in Africa. How should European policymakers understand these developments and respond to them? To answer this question, this report looks at Russia’s engagement in Africa, reaching three main conclusions.

First, Moscow’s engagement with Africa has so far remained limited as compared to that of other global players, particularly in the economic domain. The current level of (media) attention devoted to Russia’s role in Africa is thus not supported by sufficient evidence of its actual engagement in the continent. At the same time, however, the growth of Russia’s presence is a real trend.

In the European Investment Bank's (EIB) Global Report: The Impact and the Story, subjects that are relevant to the bank's work in Africa include resilience to the current global crises, vaccine coverage in the region, development finance in support of economic dynamism in sub-Saharan Africa and credit accessibility in the formal versus the informal sector.

This report calls on the European Union to become aware of the fact that exhilarated, sustainable and inclusive economic development in Africa is in the interest of not only the AU and the people in all its 55 Member States. It is equally in the interest of the EU and the people in all its 27 Member States. Achieving the sustainable development targets agreed upon in the United Nations’ Agenda 2030 on both our continents must become the benchmark of success for our relations, including our trade and investment policies. I welcome in this regard, that the 6th EU - AU Summit on the 17th and 18th of February 2022 in Brussels was able to agree on a Joint Vision for 2030.

Quality investment in Africa today creates the conditions for flourishing and fair trade relations tomorrow. For too long, Africa has been reduced to supplying Europe, the U.S., Russia and, nowadays, China with raw materials and agricultural commodities, with its creative potential untapped and its ability to manufacture value-added products constrained. Due to the continued direction of trade from colonial times, wealth is being transferred continuously from the African periphery to the industrialised and increasingly digitised Centres. This has resulted in poverty for a huge share of the population in Africa. The EPAs were not able to change this.

Tax Transparency in Africa is a key output of the Africa Initiative, a programme established in 2014 to ensure that African countries are equipped to exploit the latest improvements in global transparency, to better tackle tax evasion and other illicit financial flows and ultimately improve domestic resource mobilisation to support their economic development.

The 2022 edition, a co-production of the Global Forum, the African Union Commission and the African Tax Administration Forum, covers 38 African countries and informs decision makers and citizens on the continent’s latest progress and remaining challenges. The launch was part of the 11th meeting of the Africa Initiative, which was held from 14 to 16 June in Nairobi, Kenya. The event gathered high-level representatives and experts from tax administrations, regional and international organisations, as well as academia and civil society organisations.

The report by the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) - covering, specifically for Africa, developments in the agri- and food business sectors throughout the conintent - spotlights how ongoing dialogue and cooperation among partners supported developing and least-developed countries to strengthen their food safety, animal and plant health capacity, to facilitate safe trade, despite the ongoing pandemic.

The latest Annual Report provides snapshots of STDF-supported projects and project preparation grants, on lowering aflatoxin contamination in maize in Burkina Faso to reduce borders rejections; improving phytosanitary controls to boost Ugandan flower exports; promoting IT solutions for pest surveillance and reporting in the Asia-Pacific; promoting biopesticide use in Asia, Africa and Latin America to facilitate trade; prioritizing SPS investments in the Caribbean and Ecuador; and strengthening the safety and quality of Sri Lankan spices for export.